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THE LEGAL REGULATION OF LAWYERS'
CONFLICTS OF INTEREST
RICHARD A. EPSTEIN*
IrTHIS
lecture addresses the conflicts of interest that face lawyers in the
X ordinary practice of private law. The subject is one of intrinsic interest to all lawyers and economists who have an interest in the structure of
law firms and law practice. More to the point, however, this subject has
forcibly been brought to my attention in an autobiographical way. I regard myself as a full-time academic lawyer and as a part-time practitioner. One of the things that has always struck me in my limited
practicing life is that, notwithstanding my initial ignorance of the legal
rules that govern conflicts of interest, over the years I have been drawn
into a succession of conflict-of-interest situations. I have been forced to
turn down assignments that I dearly would have liked to undertake, to
write detailed letters of explanation to past and present clients, and to
obtain clearances and waivers from people after disclosure in order to
participate in a case. The problem of conflicts of interest has not been
coextensive with the nature of my legal practice, but it has been a major
issue, if not a thorn in my side. In at least one case my legal work was
the object of extensive litigation in which I was obliged to remain quiet in
a deposition before (happily) a claim of work-product and attorney-client
privilege was sustained.
For reasons I shall discuss later, I suspect that my position is not
unique. It is not possible for any lawyer in practice today to avoid the
conflict-of-interest question. To get a conflict-of-interest question wrong
may, from the perspective of the lawyer, be worse than losing a case for a
client. Moreover, such errors could well expose the errant lawyer to a
wide range of sanctions, including disqualification, forfeiture of fees, disciplinary proceedings, and perhaps in extreme cases even criminal
sanctions.
Normally, propositions of legal ethics are thought to contain obvious
injunctions about the importance of not stealing from client trust funds.
In truth, however, the legal regulation of conflicts of interest is a rich and
subtle area that has a great deal to do with the way in which legal practice is organized. Every lawyer encounters the rules of the game, and
must be prepared to respond to them before particular problems arise.
For this reason, conflicts of interest is such a vital subject to members of
the legal profession.
It is important, therefore, to understand what should be done at sev* James Parker Hall Distinguished Service Professor of Law, University of Chicago. This essay is a revised version of the lecture that was delivered as the first in the
series of John M. Olin Lectures at Fordham University School of Law on September 24,
1991.
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eral levels to deal with this problem. First, it is necessary to ask the
reason why the question of conflict of interest assumes any importance at
all. Second, it is necessary to summarize briefly the rules that govern
conflicts of interest. Third, it is necessary to ask how firms and lawyers
should behave in response to conflict of interest. Finally, it is necessary
to ask whether any reforms in the current law and practice of conflict of
interest could improve the overall operation of the legal system. In this
short lecture I shall try to survey some of the key issues that arise in this
area.
I.

WHY CONFLICTS OF INTEREST?

Before dwelling on those special features that concern conflict of interest for lawyers, it is useful to recall that at one level lawyers are simply
agents that people hire in order to help them in the affairs of life. As long
as the gathering or interpreting of information is costly, it often pays to
hire someone else to do your work for you, and to pay that person a sum
of money for his or her troubles. The usual rule of joint gains from trade
through contract applies to an agency relationship as much as it does to
anything else. The agent provides services whose value to the principal
are greater than the fee that is charged, while the cost of providing that
service is less to the agent than the fee that is received. Both sides therefore can gain from the relationship, which is why these arrangements are
so common. Concomitantly, it is quite clear that the parties would not
normally content themselves with a contract that required the principal
to pay the fee and then the agent to do exactly as he pleased.
At one level, therefore, this attorney-client contract is no different
from any other and is entitled to the same high level of presumptive respect. Yet, for the lawyer (or at least the lawyer turned transaction-cost
economist), a contract is an exchange of promises waiting for something
to go wrong. The business portion of the transaction-the services or
goods that are exchanged-may be infinitely varied, depending on the
subject matter of the bargain. The list of contractual risks that have been
identified in the legal literature, however, are remarkably constant across
a very broad spectrum of transactions.
One of these problems is aptly called that of "agency costs," which is
the economic equivalent of the conflict-of-interest question. In any contract, it is easy to promise the moon, but tempting to deliver only a slice
of green cheese. The promise may determine the scope of the obligation,
but it is the performance that ultimately matters, and it becomes necessary to find ways to monitor what the agent does in order to see that
inferior goods and services are not substituted for the higher-quality
product that was initially promised. This basic proposition about agency
costs applies to lawyers as much as it does to anyone else. The lawyer
gets only a part of the total gain of his action, be it by fee or by commission, but bears the full cost of his own actions. The risks of self-interest
are such that the attorney may not undertake actions that work for the
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benefit of the client because of the high costs of doing them. Therefore,
contractual strategies have to be devised to prevent these various forms
of contractual backsliding to take place, because if they are frequent
enough, then the market for superior service at a higher price will collapse given the pervasive problems of nondelivery.
The conflicts of interests that are faced within a law firm are extensive
and many of them are not subject to legal regulation at all. Thus, consider first the implicit conflict of interest in any employment relationship.
The established law firm is often called upon to train the new associate.
Doing so requires sharing with that associate something of the tricks of
the trade. There is a body of legal expertise to be learned: elements of
the craft, knowledge of certain portions of the court system, and often
today, knowledge of the detailed operation of a particular industry or
trade. The conflict of interest arises when the young lawyer wishes to
leave the firm and go elsewhere before the law firm has recouped its initial investment. But again, the legal system should not provide any explicit remedy for this conflict, because there is no uniform expectation
across firms about how the problem should be handled. The default rule,
which allows the associate to leave at will, has the advantage of simplicity and places a small but useful incentive on the firm to state that it
"expects" the associate not to work for the crosstown firm before two
years have elapsed. Here, there is a further question of whether such
clauses, if explicit, should be regarded as a restraint of trade, but that
question takes us too far afield here, as our major concern is with conflicts between lawyer and client, and not employment conflicts within the
firm.
Once the focus shifts to the relationship between lawyer and client,
there are many conflicts inherent in the contracting relations. The lawyer and the client must settle on a payment system-flat fee for services,
contingent fee, hourly fee-and it is not a case where one arrangement
fits all situations. But the relevant conflict-of-interest question here is of
a different sort, and concerns the lawyer's use and control over the client's private information. The goal is to be sure that any information the
client gives to the lawyer in order to obtain legal assistance does not become in the lawyer's hand a weapon to be used against the client. In
principle, information is treated like a good handed over for a limited
purpose, and the risk is strictly analogous to that of the bailee's conversion of a chattel by sale or misuse. It is more difficult to prevent the
misuse of information, however, because information cannot be returned
to the client in the same way a china bowl can be returned to a bailor.
Because information is power, the lawyer must guarantee against its misuse in order to obtain the information in the first place. Preserving, indeed creating, exclusive rights over this form of property is not easy
because these rights cannot be enforced by any system of physical possession of documents. Given the elemental nature of the problem, conflictof-interest regulation is not driven by external control; it is driven by the
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internal demands of the marketplace. That is, this form of regulation
emerged through the natural interaction of lawyers and their clients.
Just as I in my day-to-day experience as a novice consultant always
found myself making up rules for conflict of interest as I went along, so, I
discovered, has everyone else within the profession. What started out as
the standard response to a pervasive agency cost problem has crystallized
over time into a fairly strong set of legal norms that, for the most part,
seem to work well.
One of these norms is to impose an obligation of confidentiality on the
lawyer so that the information that is transferred will not be passed on to
others who could use it to hurt the client. But that strategy will not be
uniformly successful. Information does not always depreciate in value,
and it may well be impossible for a client to trace the source of a leak if
one should occur. It is therefore advisable to find other ways to prevent
this form of disruption from taking place, and one such strategy is to
adopt a rule that keeps the information out of the hands of any person
who is likely to use it in a fashion adverse to the client's interest. The
client has no incentive to entrust information to a lawyer, or indeed to
any other agent, if it can be used against the client later on. The simple
question, "do you represent any other person who could use this evidence against me?" is designed to cut off the problem of leakage before it
occurs. It is designed to separate the lawyer from temptation so that the
breach will not have to be remedied after it occurs, when it is so difficult
to identify both the source of the leak and the consequences that flow
from it.
Even this level of precaution, however, will not control against the
potential for abuse. Quite simply, the relevant information remains with
the firm even after the representation is over. After the documents are
returned, the knowledge remains in the mind of the lawyer. Any subsequent representation of a second client whose interests are adverse to
those of the first client poses a serious risk of the misappropriation of
information. It is also clear that the first client has no business leverage
over the law firm, because their relationship is over and no new one is
contemplated. At this point, the only possible remedy is legal: a suit to
bar the second representation to protect the confidentiality of the information. But here too the coercive nature of the remedy does not mean
that it is not contractual in origin. The ordinary situation where an employer seeks to restrain the new job opportunities of a former employee
in order to protect customer lists or sensitive trade information involves
similar issues. The inability to place information in a box and to keep it
there requires that alternative forms of protection be devised. The broad
boundaries that are often established substitute the risk of overclaiming
for the risk of underprotection, that is, preventing employees from using
their other natural talents in order to be sure that they do not misuse
their information. The neutralization of the lawyer from the process is
the price paid for allowing the initial information transfer, because no
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lesser means of restriction will suffice under the circumstances. So long
as the selection of lawyers is generally open, the legal prohibition against
the practice is supportable because it is difficult in the multitude of legal
specialties to find any alternative rule that is likely to command respect.
The consensual origin of the conflicts-of-interest rules is further revealed in the form of the regulation. Conflict-of-interest rules are normally waivable by a client after full disclosure. These waivers should not
be casually assumed, given the strong structural reasons that clients have
to keep information confidential and loyalties strong. But the detailed
rules surrounding waivers are not my concern here, because with a
waiver, conflict-of-interest rules operate as default rules and not as coercive ones. It is important, therefore, to ask whether the rules set the
appropriate baseline where the parties have not explicitly addressed the
conflict-of-interest issue.
Initially, it might be erroneously assumed that the belief in freedom of
contract should lead us to a background norm that denies any prohibition against a conflict of interest. I believe that this is a mistake. I have
little doubt that, if asked, most clients and most lawyers "would have"
thought that the conflict-of-interest prohibition was so important that it
"should have been understood" as part of their business relationship.
While these counterfactual assertions are on occasion convenient fictions
invoked by judges who wish to do exactly what they please in resolving
contractual disputes, I don't think that this cynical view carries the day
in this instance. The problem of conflicts of interest is too recurrent and
too important for parties to treat it as a matter of whim or fancy. The
expectations of ordinary parties may be unexpressed, but at least in this
context they are powerful and real. Indeed, in some cases I suspect that
the reason for contractual silence is not ignorance of the background
norms, but rather it is a conscious desire not to displace them. Leaving
well enough alone is both a cheap and reliable strategy.
This conclusion is reinforced by looking at the improper use of inside
information, a subject that has been extensively regulated under the securities laws but that rests in part on a secure contractual foundation.
Suppose that a law firm receives confidential investment information
from a large corporate client. Could it immediately use that information
to trade in the stocks of that client? I think that this conduct would be
regarded as wholly inappropriate, even if there were no statutory prohibition against insider trading and no explicit contractual understanding on
the subject. The law firm receives cold cash as compensation for services,
not the right to use client information for its own speculation. Otherwise, the firm's use of information could not be controlled by the client,
and the shift in share prices as a consequence of the law firm's trading
could not be calculated. If the corporate client had wanted to find a joint
venturer, then it could have made that marriage in some other market.
The strong separation of legal functions from investment functions is
thus understood as part of the normal attorney-client relationship. De-
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fault rules should be structured to recognize that conclusion, and the
same is true with respect to conflicts of interests in legal representation.
II.

INSTITUTIONAL CONFLICTS OF INTEREST

Other forms of potential conflicts of interest do not lend themselves to
the same sorts of legal treatment, because they do not involve the use of
private information, but they are still vitally important to understanding
the practice of law. Let us suppose that a large firm represents an important chemical company in its product liability litigation. The firm will be
constrained in the way it conducts the remainder of its business, even if it
keeps confidential all the facts that it receives from that client. By virtue
of its institutional position, the law firm will have to take certain strong
positions on some general and critical propositions of product liability
law: it will have to opt, for example, for narrow definitions of product
defect and for broad accounts of defenses based on plaintiff's product
misuse. Given these institutional constraints, the firm will find it uncomfortable to represent a plaintiff in an unrelated case if its forceful representation depends on taking a diametrically opposed view toward
product liability law. It is not possible to think like a populist plaintiff
and a prudent defendant at the same time.
This problem of inconsistent forensic positions depends not only on
the nature of the client base, but also on the kinds of issues that are likely
to become the subject of litigation. When I started as a torts teacher in
the late 1960s, the major questions on a lawyer's plate were not repetitive
questions of vast institutional significance. The difficult sort of question
that might be posed to an academic, for example, would involve a delicate question of proximate causation, where the question was whether
some freakish natural event or some bizarre act of a third party was sufficient to sever causal connection. The many subtleties of proximate causation preoccupied the greatest tort scholars during the first half of this
century, and were in fact the kinds of issues to which I initially directed
my scholarly attention. But for these purposes the key question is not
intellectual interest or intellectual difficulty, but the influence of tort issues on institutional structure. The key word, therefore, is "freakish." If
the litigation involved a low-probability, fact-dense issue, it was possible
to take a defendant's case in one hand and a plaintiff's case in another.
Matters are quite different today. Now that litigation focuses on mainline questions of institutional liability, the spillovers across cases dominate virtually everything else. Of necessity there is a high degree of
voluntary specialization. Voluntary sorting of firms by specialty will become the order of the day. Product defense firms do defense work; other
firms do plaintiff's work. Still other firms do insurance work that regulates conflicts between product defendants and their insurers. The level
of separation will increase because with mass torts and other forms of
modem tort litigation, institutional issues (the role of custom, statutes, or
the history of asbestos, Agent Orange, or DES) will play a large role in
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thousands of individual cases. Only in an age where lawsuits turned on
individualized facts could a single firm take cases for both plaintiffs and
defendants alike.
This conflict over principles and causes, however acute, is not one for
which any legal remedy is appropriate. The positions that law firms take
in litigated cases is a matter of public record, so there is no risk of misusing private factual information. To be forewarned, therefore, is to be
forearmed, so the prospect of disqualification (the key sanction where
confidential information is at issue) is of no particular relevance. Public
coercion is necessary to preserve private information only where there is a
subsequent representation with an adverse interest. In cases of inconsistent overall legal approaches, self-help and market segmentation should
suffice.
III.

CONFLICTS, FIRM STRUCTURE, AND FIRM PRACTICES

The problems of specialization are worthy of some further comment.
The pressure on both market segmentation and conflict disqualifications
have risen in recent years, and I believe that this point is tied to the
degree of specialization within the law and to the nature of the institutional litigation that has become ever more common. Whereas years ago
it was often possible for a single lawyer to hang up a shingle that announced expertise in corporations, torts, commercial litigation, or securities law, today these broad fields are giving way to narrower areas of
specialization, both for counseling and litigation. Torts becomes medical
malpractice and products liability claims. Medical malpractice becomes
obstetrical or neurological disorders. Products liability is a hopelessly
broad category. There are lawyers who specialize in drugs, in chemicals,
in machine tools, in mass torts, in guns or beer or cigarettes. Corporations becomes mergers and acquisitions, or proxy fights, and so on down
the line. This specialization has become necessary in the practice of law,
as it was in the medical field, in order to maintain professional competence, even if many academics, such as myself, are incurable generalists.
Specialization has powerful consequences for the range of clients that
lawyers are able to serve in the ordinary course of their business. Today
it is less possible to draw clients from a wide range of different work.
Instead, when the stakes are very large, clients want lawyers who have
real experience in a given area, just the way a patient with a brain tumor
wants to hire a physician who has done many similar surgeries. But
while the only constraint on the surgeon is that of time, the same is not
true for the lawyer. The huge concentration of cases in a narrow area of
expertise increases the pressure of the conflicts-of-interest question. The
very knowledge that makes a lawyer marketable today may be the same
information that makes it impossible for him or her to undertake certain
forms of business tomorrow. The experience in an area that attracts future clients embraces the confidential knowledge that may make it impossible to serve them.
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The problem is exacerbated when one recalls that the conflict-of-interest rules operate not only at the level of the individual lawyer, but also at
the level of the firm. If some lawyers inside the firm take one client in a
given area, then others within that firm are effectively barred from representing clients with adverse interests, either because they face the loss of
business from the first client, or because of the threat of disqualification.I
In that setting it becomes clear that one can no longer regard the size of
the firm as an exogenous factor that operates independently of the conflict-of-interest rules. Sheer size thus creates conflicts of interest that no
amount of planning can avoid. Firms will reconfigure themselves in order to avoid the systematic conflicts that they may otherwise face. One
obvious implication of the theory is that firms cannot represent both
plaintiffs and defendants in institutional litigation. Less obviously, perhaps, it is also very difficult for a single firm to specialize in both the
defense of an underlying tort action and in the insurance coverage dispute between insurer and insured that so often accompanies the tort litigation. The insurance firm is interested in minimizing the level of
liability ex post, while the plaintiff's lawyers assiduously seek to expand
it.
The question of conflict of interest is also relevant to firms that are on
the same side of the market. To see how this last point works, consider a
firm that has four or five groups that specialize in corporate takeovers.
When a large deal is on the horizon, it is clear that only one group within
the firm can participate. Once it has a client, then the other groups are
effectively foreclosed from representation by the conflict-of-interest rules
that are involved. But why should those groups stay on the sideline? If
the firm were to split into separate parts, then each of the groups involved could enter the fray without being foreclosed by what any other
group has done. The pressure for the division of the firm into several
distinct competing units is therefore insistent. The break-off of subunits
is one way to respond to that situation.
It should not be supposed, however, that the conflict-of-interest question is the only force that influences the choice of firm size. For certain
major corporate deals, it might well be necessary to assemble a large,
integrated team of lawyers on short notice. The break-up of the single
mega-law firm into a large number of equal pieces could well disable the
firm from competing in that market. The actual distribution of firms by
size and specialization in the marketplace is likely to be the result of a
delicate minuet, as the various players try to trade off the gains and losses
of various firm sizes. At any given moment it is highly unlikely that all
firms will be of the same size. Nor is the equilibrium that forms at one
time likely to prove stable, for the mix of firms may well depend on the
nature of the deals that loom on the corporate horizon. The very large
1. See Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rules 1.7, 1.10(a) & Comment [6].
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firms of the 1980s may have to downsize today, when deals are more
modest in their proportions.
The converse problem, it might be added, could arise with the proposed merger of two or more firms. If the two firms have inconsistent
client bases, some of which will have to be turned away after merger,
then they might not be able to consummate the deal. Despite the potential economies of scale that would result from the merger, both firms risk
losing their ideal client composition.
Merger and break-up are not the only possible responses to the conffict-of-interest question. In an individual case, it may be possible to resolve, or at least side-step, a conflict by referring either or both sides in
the case outside of the office. But there are risks involved. It is very
difficult for a law firm to keep the unrelated business of a client that it is
opposing in what might be a life-or-death matter. So it is possible that
both clients will have to get separate counsel, in which case neither may
return to the original fold. In order to forestall this problem, many firms
develop a kind of buddy system, in which they refer certain matters to
smaller firms who implicitly promise not to take the entire business. This
promise can be informally bonded by making referrals to boutique law
firms that are not capable of providing full-line services to a major corporate client. Alternatively, the firm can provide the smaller firm with a
steady flow of business that can be cut off if the firm on referral makes a
play to keep the client. The strategy may work well in most instances,
but for some small firms the prospect of luring one large client may make
it worthwhile to lose other sources of business.
The influence of conflict-of-interest regulations is not confined to those
cases in which there are transformations in the organic structure of the
law firm. They can also arise with the shift in personnel between firms.
The issue recurs constantly because the mobility of labor in legal markets
is as important as it is everywhere else. Competition between firms depends in part on the ability of one firm to lure away the partners and
associates, whether disgruntled or contented, of one firm to another. If
the conflict-of-interest rules become too stringent, then the newly hired
lawyer will carry into the new environment infectious disabilities that
will preclude his new firm from taking on new business, and disabilities
that might require the firm to give up business that it already enjoys.
The problem could be especially acute if the knowledge of any lawyer in
the former firm were imputed to the lawyer who changed positions.
Fortunately, the rules are sensitive to these concerns and make two
sensible accommodations to the basic problem. First, the knowledge of
other members of the old firm are not imputed to the new lawyer unless
there is reason to believe that there is some personal knowledge. 2 Second, the new lawyer may be assigned to matters that are independent of
his former association. The changes in the composition of the workforce
2. See id. Rule 1.9(b), (c) & Comments [7]-[9].

HeinOnline -- 60 Fordham L. Rev. 587 1991-1992

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 60

creates strong pressures to compartmentalize the information within a
firm. There is a real cost of knowing things that are not needed in dayto-day work. The creation of the so-called "Chinese wall" to create separate zones within the firm, and the requirement that files be opened to
lawyers only on a "need-to-know" basis, are some of the internal responses that firms have to make in order to cope with the conflict-ofinterest problem.
Thus far I have spoken about the influence of conflict-of-interest concerns on the structure of firm practice. But these concerns have other
practical implications as well. The most vivid way I can make the point
is to ask a rhetorical question: When does a new firm face its first conflict-of-interest problem? If the answer given is, "when there is a genuine
question of whether the firm can take the second client given that it now
has the first client," then the answer is wrong.
The first conflict of interest question for any firm arises when the first
client walks into the law firm. The willingness to take the first client
forecloses the ability to take other clients, either because of the general
positions that must be adopted or because of the actual conflicts that can
emerge in ongoing litigation. Therefore, to take a small client in a large
case may well block the firm from taking another client whose stake in
the litigation is far greater. Moreover, once the initial client is accepted,
any effort to negotiate a subsequent release is likely to be so ticklish that
it is better not attempted at all.
The point was brought home to me years ago when an insurance executive with whom I worked commented in passing that he was unable to
hire his first-choice firm for a mass tort litigation because the firm had
already committed itself to another, more marginal litigant in the case.
He expressed the wish that the law firm, with whom he had had business
relations in the past, had called him first before accepting this client. The
advice seems sufficiently wise that I pass it on here. The initial clients
and causes selected by the firm will influence its subsequent areas of specialization and growth. It is critical, therefore, to be aware of conflict-ofinterest problems before they arise in concrete form, and not only
afterwards.
IV.

LEND-LEASE FOR LAWYERS

There are still other ways in which the demands of mass litigation influence the practice of law. The typical lawsuit involves a huge number
of individual plaintiffs arrayed against a large class of institutional defendants. The most obvious concern on both sides of the line is the duplicative costs of running so extensive a show. There is a clear effort to
economize on acquiring the information about the particular facts associated with the litigation. There is a question of what the physical properties of certain substances are, questions of prior regulatory approvals for
placing products on the markets, questions of what key officials knew or
did not know when the product was first marketed, and so on. As long
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as the facts and legal issues are repetitive, it pays to reduce the number of
times that persons on the same side of a case will subject those facts to an
independent examination. In part, the problems of duplication are
solved by a division of responsibility among the firms charged with handling the litigation. In part, however, the problem is insoluble, a testament to the extraordinary waste that crops up in major civil litigation
today.
For these purposes, it is important to realize that conflicts of interests
in mass tort litigation can arise when the same lawyer is retained by parties who are on the same side of mass litigation. The problem has been of
great importance for academic consultants, like myself, whose expertise
lies in free association, far from the issues of day-to-day management in
major tort litigation. While the co-defendants' overall objective is the
same-to minimize exposure to suit-their initial positions may be different because of what they knew and what they did. For example, one of
two defendants may face a risk of punitive damages that the other does
not. But even if their practical positions are the same, they may well
wish to pursue different strategies in facing a common threat. The imperfect parallelisms of their position give rise, up front, to a conflict of
interest for any lawyer who attempts to represent them jointly. It does
not follow, however, that this conflict of interest poses an absolute bar to
that representation, for both clients may choose to waive their objections
after disclosure.
Yet, the question of waiver in this context is far more subtle than a
simple "all-or-nothing" question. Owing to the continuing interest of
both firms in the matter, the waivers may themselves become fairly complicated agreements between the relevant clients and the attorneys. The
gains from joint representation are often understood as sufficiently large
so that it is efficient to allow the conflict to occur, to mitigate its adverse
effects, and to run the irreducible risk that some major dislocation may
occur in the future. In my experience the waivers that are obtained in
these joint representation agreements assume the status of a "lend-lawyer" agreement, reminiscent, at least by way of allegory, of the famous
"lend-lease" agreement of Churchill and Roosevelt just before World
War II.
The obvious benefits of these lend-lawyer agreements is that they permit two clients to share the expertise of a single lawyer. This arrangement has of course the obvious benefit of reducing the total bill, given
that the second client does not have to educate the lawyer from scratch
about the details of the case. There are more subtle benefits that are
generated as well. First, the use of the same lawyer by separate clients
increases the likelihood that the co-defendants (or co-plaintiffs) will forge
a common strategic alliance against the other side. The uniform views of
a single outsider are exerted against both firms. The ability to reduce
dissonance within the coalition makes it more difficult for individual defendants to be picked off in settlements, and it reduces the internal con-
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flicts between co-parties over the many strategic decisions (do we take an
interlocutory appeal now, or await the completion of discovery?) that can
easily divide parties on the same side of a case. Second, the use of a
smaller number of lawyers reduces the likelihood of a breach in confidentiality. The fewer the persons who have to be entrusted with confidential
information, the less likely a damaging leak.
When the dust has settled, all sides can gain. The lawyer receives
more work; the first client has a greater influence on the views of the
second; the second client has lower costs in training the lawyer; and the
increased likelihood of a common approach redounds to the benefit of
all. Nonetheless, it is clear that the common arrangement may eventually fall apart if some strong disagreement of principle arises between the
parties that makes it impossible for the joint representation to continue.
A parting of the ways might become inevitable if, for example, one client
decided to sue another for indemnification and contribution-a move
that is relatively infrequent given that any suit between co-defendants
increases the chances of plaintiff's success.
But if the infrequent does happen, what then? As a first approximation, it seems clear that the lawyer who has engaged in the joint representation is under a duty to withdraw from the case given that he possesses
confidential information from both sides. Yet it may be possible to alter
that situation by contract after disclosure: to make it clear that in the
event that the conflict does arise, one client, typically (but not necessarily) the lending client, has the right to insist on the exclusive loyalty of
the lawyer. It is quite possible that this arrangement will prove so awkward that the lawyer will choose to withdraw even if allowed to stay on.
Nevertheless, the presence of a clause of this sort in the lend-lawyer
agreement may reduce the possibility of a complete withdrawal by the
attorney. Where the non-controlling client knows that the joint representation may be ruptured, it can protect itself in part by limiting the
information that it passes over to the other client. In addition, there is
typically so much sharing of information between co-defendants that disqualification of the shared expert may be unwarranted because all the
information that he possesses has been shared between clients during the
period of joint representation. In this setting, the rights of the first client
to control the use of the shared lawyer should ex ante be welcomed by
both sides because it makes possible the joint representation in the first
place. I have been in several of these situations during my career, and all
have worked out well to date. I shall keep my fingers crossed.
V.

SETTING THE RULES OF THE GAME

Thus far my discussion has focused on the origins of conflict-of-interest problems and on the responses that firms and lawyers can make to
them. In order to round out this discussion it is useful to examine briefly
the legal rules that should be used to regulate this system. Of course, the
basic rule is one that allows waiver after disclosure to dominate. But
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even the presence of a powerful contractual solution does not eliminate
the need for some general legal approach to the subject. Contracts themselves are often incomplete, and do not specify the exact consequences
that flow if and when a conflict of interest emerges.
In dealing with the necessary legal response, it is possible to adopt one
of two general models. The first of these models takes the position that it
is never quite clear what a conflict of interest is, so that the proper judicial response is to evaluate the facts and circumstances of each case in
deciding what should be done. Given the absence of clarity in the rules,
the impulse would be to impose relatively minor sanctions on the lawyers
who deviate from the accepted conflict of interest standard, such as it is.
Firms with conflicts of interest will be allowed to collect their fees for
services rendered, and perhaps the work product of discovery and document analysis will be preserved for the benefit of the successor firm.
I believe, however, that the alternative model is the correct one. That
model works from the assumption that it is desirable, first, to have
bright-line rules, and, second, to impose very heavy sanctions on those
law firms that deviate from these rules. The point of the strategy is not
heartless cruelty. It is an effort to structure incentives so as to minimize
the number of violations that take place in order to avoid the difficulties
of running a clean-up operation, at enormous inconvenience and expense
to everyone, after the conflicts have occurred.
Let me give some examples of the kind of bright-line rules that I think
should play a role in this area. One is that as soon as a client has given a
firm any private information about his internal affairs, that firm cannot
take an interest adverse to that client if there is any chance that the information that has been handed over will be material to some subsequent
dispute.3 Obviously, if the information that has been handed over is in
response to a government antitrust suit, then it cannot be used in a private suit. But the prohibition goes deeper. If the information is handed
over in order to guide the lawyer on a tax matter, it cannot be used
against the client in a subsequent dispute over an employment contract, a
situation ably analyzed by Judge Posner in the Analytica case.4 There is
no requirement that there be a common core between the legal issues or
legal theories involved in the two disputes. It is quite enough that there
is a common core of facts so that the lawyer in the second case can use
against the client facts or information acquired in the prior
representation.
One essential feature of this position is to refuse to allow causal questions to cloud the disqualification question. If the lawyer possesses information adverse to a former client, then he is barred from handling the
case. There is no requirement to show how this information would be
used, or whether that use would compromise the position of the former
3. See id. Rules 1.8(b), 1.9(a), 1.7 & Comment [4].
4. See Analytica, Inc. v. NPD Research, Inc., 708 F.2d 1263 (7th Cir. 1983).
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client. The likelihood of adverse use is sufficiently great that there is no
reason to require anyone to engage in costly and intrusive discovery to
determine either the existence or the extent of the adverse use. It is better to make the prohibition clear and unambiguous. Once the boundaries
of the prohibition are established, lawyers have a clear buoy around
which to navigate: they can decline to take the second case. The client
at this point still has a world of lawyers from whom to choose, and there
is no need to decide which portions of the past legal effort may be preserved for the next lawyer and which have to be discarded altogether.
The severity of the sanctions is justified in light of the way it reduces the
probability of an initial violation of the conflicts-of-interest rules.
The second illustration of a clear prohibition arises out of the common
situation where a single lawyer, often for reasons of cost and convenience, is asked to represent two parties with opposing interests. Two persons who intend to go into business together ask a single lawyer to
represent both sides. At the outset the lawyer should drive home the
potential conflict of interest,5 but often the clients may rightly decide that
the savings in cost make the risk worthwhile, especially if they have a
business understanding of how they wish their deal to succeed. The
question then arises of what should be done if there is a falling out between the two parties during the course of business. It may well be that
one client sues the other, or that additional persons have been admitted
into the business, further clouding the waters.
At this point the rule again must be clear. Unless the consent of all
parties is obtained, however unlikely it is under the circumstances, then
the lawyer who represented both sides can now represent neither.' Any
law firm that has been hired to represent one side must promptly move to
disqualify any other firm that seeks to remain in the case once having
served both clients. The discovery and other work done before disqualification should be regarded as tainted, and the matter sent back to square
one. As before, the purpose of the draconian prohibition is to make it
crystal clear that this form of ambiguity will not be tolerated. The simple
rule has more power if it is not encrusted with layers of unnecessary
qualifications. While it may appear to cause hardship in individual cases,
its long-term application is apt to prove more beneficial and benevolent.
The firm that is forced to retire from the list in one case makes way for a
second firm to receive the business. Yet in some future case, the roles
may be reversed so that the first firm may receive new business that
might not have come its way. The important thing is to preserve sound
institutional structures, and to let the financial and business impacts in
individual cases fall where they may. Any inequities are apt to wash out
in the long run, at least where repeat players are involved.
There is yet one additional reason why clear disqualification rules of
5. See Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.7(b)(2) & Comments [7], [11][12].
6. See id. Rules 1.7 Comments [11]-[12], 1.9 Comments [1l]-[14].
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this sort are required. During the 1980s, there were a number of important cases that addressed the appealability of disqualification orders. As
is often the case with appeals, the key question is whether the appeal
could only be brought at the end of the proceedings or whether an immediate appeal is possible. The problem can arise with either of two challenges: the disqualification may be allowed, and the firm that is
disqualified may seek to get back into the suit. Alternatively, the firm is
not disqualified, and the risk is that after the entire case is tried, the
matter will have to be retried, after fresh discovery, because disqualification should have been ordered.
The problems with any rule are manifold. If one adheres to the standard, final judgment rule in these two situations, it is possible that an
enormous injustice will take place, for an entire trial will roll back with a
firm that should not be present, or without one that should be present.
But the alternative of immediate appeal is scarcely any better, for that
right can be exercised not only in the interests of justice, but also by firms
that seek a strategic advantage in delay. No matter whether the appeal is
allowed immediately or postponed to the end of trial, the error costs will
remain high at least if the rules themselves are incapable of clear application. The need forper se rules in this context is of heightened importance
because they reduce the need for appellate resolution of what is an otherwise difficult issue. Again, the hard issue of timing of appeals is largely
skirted by a set of substantive rules on disqualification that calls for
straightforward application in routine cases. We cannot ask for more
than this from any general set of pronouncements.
In general, therefore, I think that we can regard the set of rules that
govern conflicts of interest for lawyers as a modest success in a difficult
area of law and business practice. The issue of conflict of interest is
forced upon firms by the nature of modern institutional practice, by the
importance of specialization in legal practice, and by the imperative business need to restrict access to confidential information. Any set of rules
that is put forward to deal with these problems is apt to produce dislocations in some cases and occasional injustices in others. But once lawyers
recognize, as I believe they have, that conflicts of interest are an unavoidable part of legal practice, then they should be resigned to the inevitable
set of problems that are apt to crop up as part of the daily life cycle of the
profession.
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